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FINANCIAL EQUILIBRIUM WITH ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION AND
RANDOM HORIZON
UMUT C¸ETIN
Abstract. We study in detail and explicitly solve the version of Kyle’s model introduced in a
specific case in [2], where the trading horizon is given by an exponentially distributed random
time. The first part of the paper is devoted to the analysis of time-homogeneous equilibria using
tools from the theory of one-dimensional diffusions. It turns out that such an equilibrium is only
possible if the final payoff is Bernoulli distributed as in [2]. We show in the second part that the
signal of the market makers use in the general case is a time-changed version of the one that they
would have used had the final payoff had a Bernoulli distribution. In both cases we characterise
explicitly the equilibrium price process and the optimal strategy of the informed trader. Contrary
to the original Kyle model it is found that the reciprocal of market’s depth, i.e. Kyle’s lambda, is
a uniformly integrable supermartingale. While Kyle’s lambda is a potential, i.e. converges to 0, for
the Bernoulli distributed final payoff, its limit in general is different than 0.
1. Introduction
The canonical model of markets with asymmetric information is due to Kyle [13]. Kyle studies
a market for a single risky asset whose price is determined in equilibrium. There are mainly three
types of agents that constitute the market: a strategic risk-neutral informed trader with a private
information regarding the future value of the asset, non-strategic uninformed noise traders, and a
number of risk-neutral market makers competing for the net demand from the strategic and non-
strategic traders. The key feature of this model is that the asset value becomes public knowledge
at a fixed deterministic date and the market makers cannot distinguish the informed trades from
the uninformed ones but ‘learn’ from the net demand by ‘filtering’ what the informed trader knows,
which is ‘corrupted’ by the noise demand. The private information of the informed trader is static,
i.e. it is obtained at the beginning of the trading and does not change over time. The nature of
this information is not really important: It could be inside information about the future payoff of
the asset or an unbiased estimator of the future payoff. The latter is a more suitable interpretation
when the strategic informed trader is a big investment bank with a good research division producing
sophisticated research that is not shared with the public.
Kyle’s model is in discrete time and assumes that the noise traders follow a random walk and
the future payoff of the asset has a normal distribution. This has been extended to a continuous
time framework with general payoffs by Back [1]. In this extension the total demand of the noise
traders is given by a Brownian motion and the future payoff of the asset has a general continuous
distribution while the informed trader’s private information is still static. Kyle’s model and its
continuous-time extension by Back have been further extended to allow multiple informed traders
([11], [3]), to include default risk [6] or to the case when the single informed trader receives a
continuous signal as private information ([4] and [7]).
Our first goal in this paper is to study a time-homogeneous version of this model introduced by
Back and Baruch in [2]. The time-homogeneity refers to the SDE corresponding to the market price
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having time homogeneous coefficients, and the insider’s optimal decisions depending only on the
price of the traded asset - not on time. This is in part due to the assumption that the asset value,
Γ, is announced at a random exponential time, τ , with mean r−1 for some r > 0 and independent
from all other variables in the model. The informed trader knows Γ but not τ . Thus, she has an
informational advantage over the other traders; however, this can end at any time since τ will come
as a suprise to the informed trader as it does to the others. Back and Baruch compute the market
depth and the informed trader’s strategy as a function of price, which is only characterised implicitly
using an inverse operation. Moreover, their method does not allow an explicit characterisation of
the distribution of the equilibrium price process.
In Section 3.1 we analyse the model of Back and Baruch using tools from the theory of one-
dimensional diffusions. We show that in equilibrium the market makers construct a transient
Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process, Y , that they will use for pricing. A particular consequence of this is
that the pricing rule becomes a scale function of Y . In addition we identify the value function, J , of
the strategic trader with an r-excessive function of a certain h-transform of the Ornstein-Uhlenbeck
process.
Back and Baruch postulate the equilibrium controls for the market makers and the informed
trader and then verify that these indeed constitute an equilibrium. We, on the other hand, study
in detail the admissible pricing rules for the market makers given a large class of admissible strategies
of the informed trader and characterise the ones that can appear in the equilibrium. It turns out
that the market makers can choose from a continuum of controls in the equilibrium; however, every
such choice will lead to the same SDE for the equilibrium price process.
Consistent with what was observed earlier by Back and Baruch we show that the process mea-
suring the price impact of trades, i.e. Kyle’s lambda, is a uniformly integrable supermartingale
converging to 0, i.e. a potential. As a result, the market gets more liquid on average as time passes.
This is a deviation from Kyle [13] who predicted that the Kyle’s lambda must follow a martingale
preventing ‘systematic changes’ in the market depth as explained in [3] and [9]. In the absence
of such systematic changes, the insider cannot acquire a large position when the depth is low to
liquidate at a later date when the liquidity is higher to obtain unbounded profits. In the model
we study, even if the market gets more liquid as time passes, there are no opportunities for the
informed trader to make infinite profits since the market can end at any time interval [t, t + dt]
with probability rdt.
One of the advantages of the approach used in this paper is that it identifies the distribution
of the price process explicitly. The explicit form of the solutions, however, also indicate that one
cannot have an equilibrium, where the price process is a time-homogeneous diffusion, if the asset
value has a non-Bernoulli distribution as explained in Remark 2. A recent work by Collin-Dufresne
et al. [8], on the other hand, hints at the direction that one should follow for a general payoff
distribution. Collin-Dufresne et al. [8] study a version of the Kyle model where the announcement
date is a jump time of a Poisson process with non-constant intensity and the asset value has a
Gaussian distribution using linear Kalman filtering. It turns out in their model that the diffusion
coefficient of the SDE for the equilibrium price should be time dependent.
Motivated by their result we study in Section 3.2 an extension of the model of Back and Baruch
to a large class of payoff distributions. It turns out that the signal that the market makers use
when the payoff has a general distribution is a time-changed transient Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process.
The time change, V (t), is deterministic with V (∞) <∞. The finiteness of the time-change implies
that the limiting distribution of the market makers’ signal is a non-degenerate normal distribution.
This particular feature allows us to extend the model of Back and Baruch to a much more general
setting, including the normally distributed case considered in [8].
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As in the other works on the Kyle model we establish that the informed trader’s trades are
inconspicuous in the equilibrium. That is, the equilibrium distribution of the total demand is the
same as that of cumulative noise trades. An essential difference, on the other hand, from the earlier
works on this subject is that the equilibrium prices exhibit a jump at the announcement date, τ .
This is only natural since τ is unknown to the informed trader and, thus, there is no strategy to
ensure that the market price converges almost surely to Γ as time approaches to τ , which is a totally
inaccessible stopping time even for the informed. However, what the informed trader can do is the
following strategy, which will in fact turn out to be her equilibrium strategy: She can make sure
that Pt, the market price conditioned on survival, i.e., [τ > t], converge to Γ as t → ∞. That is,
conditioned on indefinite survival market prices converge to the true payoff. Note that indefinite
survival has 0 probability due to the finiteness of τ , hence a jump in prices at time τ occur with
probability 1.
The outline of the paper is as follows: Section 2 introduces the model, defines the admissible
controls for the market makers as well as the informed trader, and ends with a characterisation of
the market makers’ pricing choice. The equilibrium when the final payoff has a Bernoulli and a
general distribution are solved in Sections 3.1 and 3.2, respectively. Finally, Section 4 concludes.
2. The setup
Let (Ω,F , (Ft)t≥0,P) be a filtered probability space satisfying the usual conditions of right con-
tinuity and P-completeness. We suppose that F0 is not trivial and there exists an F0-measurable
random variable, Γ, taking values in R. Moreover, the filtered probability space also supports a
standard Brownian motion, B, with B0 = 0 and, thus, B is independent of Γ. We also assume the
existence of an F-measurable random variable, τ , which is independent of F∞ and has exponential
distribution with mean 0 < r−1 <∞. In particular, τ is independent of Γ as well as B.
The measure induced by Γ on R will be denoted by ν, i.e. ν(A) := P(Γ ∈ A) for any Borel subset
of R. We further assume the existence of a family of probability measures, (Pv)v∈R, such that the
following disintegration formula holds:
P(E) =
∫
R
Pv(E)ν(dv), ∀E ∈ F . (2.1)
The existence of such a family is easily justified when we consider Ω = R × C(R+,R), where
C(R+,R) is the space of real valued continuous functions on R+. We set P
v = P if v /∈ supp(ν).
We also assume that Γ is square integrable. That is,
E[Γ] =
∫
R
v2ν(dv) <∞. (2.2)
We consider a market in which the risk free interest rate is set to 0 and a single risky asset is
traded. The fundamental value of this asset equals Γ, which will be announced at the random time
τ .
There are three types of agents that interact in this market:
i) Liquidity traders who trade for reasons exogenous to the model and whose cumulative
demand at time t is given by Bt.
ii) A single informed trader, who knows Γ from time t = 0 onwards, and is risk neutral. We
will call the informed trader insider in what follows and denote her cumulative demand at
time t by θt. The filtration of the insider, GI , is generated by observing the price of the
risky asset, Γ, and whether the announcement has been made, that is, whether τ > t or
not for each t ≥ 0. The filtration will also be assumed to be completed with the null sets
of (Pv)v∈R.
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iii) Market makers observe only the net demand of the risky asset, X = B + θ, whether τ > t
or not for each t ≥ 0, and Γ when it is made public at τ . Thus, their filtration, GM , is
the minimal right-continuous filtration generated by X, (1[τ>t])t≥0, and (1[t≥τ ]Γ)t≥0, and
completed with the P-null sets. In particular, τ is a GM -stopping time. The price process
chosen by the market makers is denoted by S. Obviously, St = Γ on the set [t ≥ τ ]. Prior
to the announcement date we assume that the market price is determined according to a
Bertrand competition: Market makers make their price offers and the investors trade with
the one offering the best quote. This mechanism results in S being a GM -martingale, i.e.
St = E[Γ|GMs ]. Consequently, S∞ exists and equals Γ since P(τ <∞) = 1.
The way that the price process is determined yields the following since Γ is integrable.
Proposition 2.1. In view of the condition (2.2), for any s ≥ 0
lim
t→∞
E[|St − Γ||GMs ] = 0. (2.3)
Proof. Since limt→∞ St = Γ and Γ satisfies (2.2), we deduce that the family (St)t≥0 is uniformly
integrable (see Problem 1.3.20 in [12]) and so is (Γ− St)t≥0. Since limt→∞ |St − Γ| = 0, the claim
follows. 
In this paper, as in all other past work on Kyle’s model, we are interested in Markovian Nash
equilibria. In line with the current literature, we shall assume that the price chosen by the market
makers is a deterministic function of some process, Y , which solves dYt = w(t, Yt)dXt+b(t, Yt)dt for
some weighting function, w, and drift function, b, chosen by the market makers (see, e.g., [1, 4, 7]
among others for the use of a weighting function in the construction of market makers’ signal).
Before defining what we mean precisely by an equilibrium in this model we introduce the class
of admissible controls for the market makers and the informed trader.
Definition 2.1. The pair ((w, b, y), h) is an admissible pricing rule for the market makers if for
some interval (l, u) ⊂ R, y ∈ (l, u), and w : R+ × (l, u) 7→ (0,∞), b : R+ × (l, u) 7→ R, and
h : R+ × (l, u) 7→ R are measurable functions such that h(t, ·) is strictly increasing for every t > 0,
w is bounded away from 0 on compact subsets of R+ × (l, u), and for any Brownian motion, β,
there exists a unique strong solution without explosion1 to
Yt = z +
∫ t
0
w(s, Ys)dβs +
∫ t
0
b(s, Ys)ds, ∀z ∈ (l, u).
Given an admissible pricing rule, ((w, b, y), h), the market makers will set the price on [τ > t] to
be h(t, Yt), where Y follows
Yt = y +
∫ t
0
w(s, Ys) {dBs + dθs}+
∫ t
0
b(s, Ys)ds, (2.4)
whenever θ is an admissible strategy for the insider.
Since h is strictly monotone, Y is perfectly observable by the traders, in particular by the
insider. In conjunction with the assumption that w is bounded away from 0 on compact subsets of
R+× (l, u) this will entail that the insider can observe B since she clearly knows her own strategy,
θ. This assumption, thus, also ensures that the insider’s filtration is well-defined and is generated
by B,Γ, and (τ ∧ t)t≥0. This is worth noting since, otherwise, we may run into problems with the
well-posedness of the model as the insider’s trading strategy may depend on the observations of
the price process that is adapted to the filtration generated by X, which depends crucially on the
insider’s trading strategy.
1That is, the boundary points l and u are not to be reached in finite time.
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Definition 2.2. Given an admissible pricing rule ((w, b, y), h), θ is an admissible strategy for the
insider if θ is of finite variation and the following conditions are satisfied.
(1) θ is absolutely continuous:
θt =
∫ t
0
αsds,
for some GI -adapted α, where GI is the minimal right continuous filtration generated by
B,Γ and (τ ∧ t)t≥0, and completed with the (Pv)v∈R-null sets.
(2) There exists a unique strong solution to
Yt = z +
∫ t
0
w(s, Ys)dXs +
∫ t
0
b(s, Ys)ds, ∀z ∈ (l, u).
(3) The following integrability condition holds:
Ev
∫ τ
0
h2(t, Yt)dt <∞, ∀v ∈ supp(ν), (2.5)
where Y is the unique strong solution of (2.4).
The assumption that the strategy is absolutely continuous is without any loss of generality since
any strategy with positive quadratic variation is necessarily suboptimal due to the price impact of
the trades (see [1] for a proof of this fact).
Faced with an admissible pricing rule ((w, b, y), h) the insider employs an admissible strategy, θ,
and achieves
Wτ =
∫
[0,τ ]
θsdh(s, Ys) + θτ (Γ− h(τ, Yτ )),
as its total profit when the public announcement is made and the trading possibilities end, where Y
is the strong solution to (2.4), which exists and is unique since θ is admissible. Note that the term
θτ (Γ−h(τ, Yτ )) is due to a potential jump in the price when the true value is revealed. Integrating
by parts we obtain a more convenient representation:
Wτ =
∫ τ
0
(Γ− h(s, Ys))αsds.
Being risk-neutral the informed trader’s goal is to maximise EvWτ within the class of admissible
strategies.
Definition 2.3. ((w∗, b∗, y∗), h∗, α∗) is an equilibrium if
(1) ((w∗, b∗, y∗), h∗) is an admissible pricing rule for the market makers;
(2) θ∗ defined by θ∗t =
∫ t
0 α
∗
sds is an admissible trading strategy for the insider given ((w
∗, b∗, y∗), h∗);
(3) St = 1[τ>t]h
∗(t, Y ∗t ) + 1[τ≤t]Γ is a GM -martingale, where Y ∗ is the unique strong solution
of (2.4) with w = w∗ and b = b∗;
(4) θ∗ maximises the expected profits for the insider. That is,
Ev
∫ τ
0
(v − h∗(s, Y ∗s ))α∗sds = sup
α∈A
Ev
∫ τ
0
(v − h∗(s, Y ∗s ))αsds, ∀v ∈ supp(ν),
where A is the class of all admissible strategies given the admissible pricing rule ((w∗, b∗, y∗), h∗).
Since τ is independent of Γ and B, the market makers as well as the insider will not use controls
that depends on τ in the equilibrium. In this case the expected value of the final wealth of the
insider will equal
Ev[Wτ ] =
∫ ∞
0
e−rsEv [(v − h(s, Ys))αs] ds. (2.6)
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Let us denote by FX the minimal right continuous filtration containing the P-null sets and with
respect to which X is adapted. When the insider uses strategies that are independent of τ , this
will render X independent of τ as well. In this case one should expect that
St = Pt1[t<τ ] + Γ1[t≥τ ],
where P is a semimartingale adapted to FX . The following proposition shows that this is indeed
the case and gives a characterisation of P in terms of Γ.
Proposition 2.2. Suppose that X is independent of τ and all FX -martingales are continuous.
Then, Pt = E[Γ|FXt ], i.e. P is the FX -optional projection of Γ. In particular, P is continuous.
The proof of the above result is delegated to Appendix A. However, it is worth to mention here
that the proof does not rely on market makers making their pricing decision in a Markovian manner,
i.e. Pt = h(t, Yt), where Y follows (2.4). That is, whatever the pricing decision is, it must satisfy
Pt = E[Γ|FXt ] whenever X is independent of τ and all FX -martingale are continuous2.
In view of the above characterisation of the pricing decision, P , of the market makers, we will
search for an equilibrium in the next section by studying the optimal trading choices of the insider.
As our focus is not on the uniqueness of the equilibrium, we shall follow our intuition and consider
trading strategies that are independent of τ . Accordingly, the following section will establish the
existence of an equilibrium, where X is independent of τ .
3. Insider’s optimisation problem and the equilibrium
3.1. Bernoulli distributed liquidation value. In this section we assume that Γ takes values in
{0, 1} as in [2] and set p := ν({1}), i.e the probability that the liquidation value equals 1.
Under this assumption we shall next see that one can obtain an equilibrium where the coefficients
in (2.4) as well as the pricing function, h, do not depend on time. Consequently, the solution of
the optimisation problem for the insider will be time-homogeneous as well.
We first try to formally obtain the Bellman equations associated to the value function of the
insider. To this end, as observed above, suppose that X is independent of τ and the market makers
set the price at time t on [t < τ ] to be h(Yt) for some sufficiently smooth h, where
dYt = a(Yt)dXt + φ(Yt)dt.
Also recall that dXt = dBt + αtdt, where αtdt represents the infinitesimal trades of the insider.
In view of (2.6) we may consider the following value function for the insider’s problem given that
Γ = v:
J(x) = sup
α
Ev
[∫ ∞
0
e−rs(v − h(Ys))αsds
∣∣∣∣Y0 = x
]
. (3.7)
Formally, J solves
sup
α
{
1
2
a2J ′′ + J ′(aα+ φ) + α(v − h)− rJ
}
= 0.
Thus, if it is three times continuously differentiable, we expect to have
aJ ′ = h− v (3.8)
1
2
a2J ′′ + J ′φ− rJ = 0. (3.9)
2As we shall see in the next section all FX -martingales are continuous in the equilibrium. In general a sufficient
conditions for this property is E
∫ t
0
α
2
sds < ∞ for all t > 0 (see Corollary 8.10 of [16]).
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The first identity yields
J ′ =
h− v
a
, J ′′ =
h′
a
− h− v
a2
a′, and J ′′′ =
h′′
a
− 2h
′a′
a2
− (h− v)a
′′
a2
+ 2
(h− v)(a′)2
a3
.
Plugging the above into the second identity yields
0 =
a2
2
h′′ + h′φ− (h− v)
[
aa′′
2
+
a′
a
φ− φ′ + r
]
.
Since h cannot depend on Γ, we obtain the following conditions for the candidate pricing rule h
and the coefficients a and φ that will be chosen by the market makers to construct the price.
1
2
a2h′′ + h′φ = 0 (3.10)
1
2
a2a′′ + a′φ+ (r − φ′)a = 0. (3.11)
Looking at this equation we may guess that in the equilibrium
dYt = a(Yt)dB
Y
t + φ(Yt)dt, (3.12)
where BY is a GM -Brownian motion, and a and φ solve (3.11). The following shows that all such
processes can be obtained from an Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process.
Proposition 3.1. Suppose that Y is a regular one-dimensional diffusion on (l, u) defined by the
generator
1
2
a2
d2
dx2
+ φ
d
dx
,
where a > 0 and φ are two functions satisfying (3.11) on (l, u). Assume further that for any
y ∈ (l, u) there exists a unique weak solution of (3.12) and the following integrability condition
holds for some c ∈ (l, u)
f(x) :=
∫ x
c
1
a(y)
<∞, ∀x ∈ (l, u).
If Rt = f(Yt), then R is an Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process with the generator
A =
1
2
d2
dx2
+ (rx+ d)
d
dx
, (3.13)
for some d ∈ R.
Proof. Clearly, Y solves (3.12) with some Brownian motion BY . Thus, it follows from Ito’s formula
that
dRt = dB
Y
t +
{
φ(f−1(Rt))
σ(f−1(Rt))
− 1
2
σ′(f−1(Rt))
}
dt.
Using (3.11) one can easily check that the derivative of the function
y 7→ φ(f
−1(y))
σ(f−1(y))
− 1
2
σ′(f−1(y))
equals r, which yields the claim. 
In view of the above proposition we expect the equilibrium price process to be a function of
an Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process. Thus, there is no harm in choosing a ≡ 1 and φ = rx + d for
some d ∈ R. This means that the pricing rule, h, will be a scale function of the diffusion with the
generator (3.13). Recall that the choice of a and φ are made by the market makers. Thus, the
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market makers will construct their signal, Y , such that it is a transient process in the equilibrium
(|Yt| → ∞ when Y is defined by (3.13)).
Lemma 3.1. Define
s(x) =
√
r
π
∫ x
−∞
exp
(
−r
(
y +
d
r
)2)
dy. (3.14)
Then s is a scale function for the diffusion defined by (3.13) with s(−∞) = 1− s(∞) = 0.
Proof. It is straightforward to check that As = 0. Moreover, s is the cumulative distribution
function for a normal random variable implying the boundary conditions. 
Theorem 3.1. Let E ∈ F0 and consider the SDE
dYt = dBt +
{
rYt + d+ 1E
s′(Yt)
s(Yt)
− 1Ec s
′(Yt)
1− s(Yt)
}
dt, Y0 = y ∈ R,
where s is as given by (3.14). Then, there exists a unique strong solution to the above. The solution,
in particular, satisfies
lim
t→∞
Yt(ω) =
{ ∞, if ω ∈ E;
−∞, if ω ∈ Ec.
Moreover, if P(E) = s(y), we have
P(E|FYt ) = s(Yt),
and, consequently,
dYt = dB
Y
t + {rYt + d} dt
in its own filtration, where BY is a Brownian motion.
Proof. Consider an Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process, R, with the generator (3.13) in some probability
space (Ω,G, (Gt)t≥0, P ) such that there exists a set F ∈ G0 with P (F ) = P(E). Clearly, M :=
1F
s(R)
s(y) + 1F c
1−s(R)
1−s(y) is a bounded martingale with E[M0] = 1. Thus, defining Q on G by dQdP =M∞
yields the existence of a weak solution. Moreover, the weak solution is unique in law since Mt > 0
for t > 0. The limiting condition for Y as t→∞ follows from this construction of the weak solution
since the construction is nothing but the h-transform that achieves R∞ =∞ (resp. R∞ = −∞) on
F (resp. F c) (see Paragraph 32 on p.34 of [5]).
The SDE above in fact possesses a unique strong solution. Indeed, since σ ≡ 1, Lemma IX.3.3,
Corollary IX.3.4 and Proposition IX.3.2 in [15] imply that pathwise uniqueness holds for this SDE.
Thus, in view of the celebrated result of Yamada and Watanabe (see Corollary 5.3.23 in [12]), there
exists a unique strong solution.
Moreover, using the law of the solutions obtained via the weak construction performed above,
we have
P[E|FYt ] =
Ey
[
M∞1F |FRt
]
Ey[M∞|FRt ]
,
where Ey is expectation with respect to the product measure P y × ν, where P y is the law of R
with R0 = y and ν is the distribution of F . Since F and R are independent, under the assumption
that P(E) = s(y), we obtain
Ey
[
M∞1F |FRt
]
Ey[M∞|FRt ]
=
s(Rt)
s(y) P (F )
Ey[Mt|FRt ]
= s(Rt),
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since P (F ) = P(E) = s(y) and Ey[Mt|FRt ] = 1. Thus, a standard result from non-linear filtering
(e.g. Theorem 8.1 in [14]) yields
dYt = dB
Y
t + {rYt + d} dt
for some FY -Brownian motion. 
We now turn to the computation of insider’s value function. We will in fact verify in Proposition
3.2 that it is given by
J(x) :=
∫ x
s−1(v)
(s(y)− v)dy, (3.15)
which satisfies (3.8) by construction for h = s. Moreover,
AJ(x)− rJ(x) = 1
2
s′(x) + (s(x)− v))φ(x) − r
∫ x
s−1(v)
(s(y)− v)dy
=
1
2
s′(x) +
∫ x
s−1(v)
φ(y)s′(y)dy
=
1
2
s′(x)− 1
2
∫ x
s−1(v)
s′′(y)dy
= 0, (3.16)
since s′(s−1(v)) = 0.
Lemma 3.2. For any v ∈ {0, 1} consider the SDE
Yt = y +Bt +
∫ t
0
{
rYs + d+ 1v=1
s′(Yt)
s(Yt)
− 1v=0 s
′(Yt)
1− s(Yt)
}
ds, (3.17)
and define
Av := A+
{
1v=1
s′
s
− 1v=0 s
′
1− s
}
d
dx
.
Then, J is an r-excessive function for Av and EQve−rtJ(Yt) → 0 as t → ∞, where EQv is the
expectation operator with respect to the law of the solution of the above SDE for the given value of
v.
Proof. Recall from (3.16) that AJ − rJ = 0 and observe that
AvJ − rJ = AJ − rJ +
(
1v=1
s′
s
− r1v=0 s
′
1− s
)
(s− v)
=
(
1v=1
s′
s
− 1v=0 s
′
1− s
)
(s − v) ≤ 0.
Define the non-negative function
gv :=
(
1v=1
s′
s
− 1v=0 s
′
1− s
)
(v − s).
J will be r-excessive once we show that gv is integrable with respect to the speed measure of the
diffusion defined by Av. It follows from no. 31 on p. 34 of [5] that this measure is given by
mv(dx) :=
(
1v=1s
2(x) + 1v=0(1− s(x))2
) 2
s′(x)
dx.
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Thus, ∫ ∞
−∞
gv(x)m
v(dx) = 2
∫ ∞
−∞
s(x)(1 − s(x))dx <∞
since s is the cumulative distribution function of a normal random variable. Due to the integral
representation formula for r-excessive functions (see no. 30 on p. 33 of [5]) we thus have
J(x) =
∫ ∞
0
e−rsQvsgv(x)ds + c1ψr(x) + c2φr(x),
where (Qvt )t≥0 is the transition function for the solutions of (3.17) for a given value of v, and φr and
ψr are decreasing and increasing solutions of A
vu−ru = 0, respectively. We claim that c1 = c2 = 0.
Indeed, suppose v = 0. Then J ′(∞) = 1 and J(−∞) = 0. However, since l and u are natural
boundaries, φr(−∞) = ∞ = ψ′r(∞) (see p.19 of [5]), which in turn yields c1 = c2 = 0. Similar
considerations yield the same conclusion when v = 1.
Therefore,
e−rtQvt J(y) =
∫ ∞
t
e−rsQvsgv(y)ds.
But the above converges to 0 as t→∞. Indeed, since
Qvt gv = 1v=1
Ptsgv
s
+ 1v=0
Pt(1− s)gv
1− s ,
where (Pt)t≥0 is the transition function for the Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process with the generator
(3.13), we have
Qvt gv(y) ≤ max
{
Pts
′(y)
s(y)
,
Pts
′(y)
1− s(y)
}
≤
√
r√
π
max
{
1
s(y)
,
1
1− s(y)
}
,

In view of the above lemma we can now construct the optimal strategy of the insider when the
market makers use s as their pricing rule.
Proposition 3.2. Suppose that Pt = s(Yt), where s is given by (3.14) and
Yt = y +Xt +
∫ t
0
(rYs + d)ds.
with y ∈ R being chosen so that s(y) = p = P(Γ = 1). Then, the following strategy is optimal for
the insider:
αt =
{
Γ
s′(Yt)
s(Yt)
− (1− Γ) s
′(Yt)
1− s(Yt)
}
. (3.18)
The expected profit of the insider who uses this strategy equals J(y), where J is the function defined
in (3.15).
Proof. Let J be given by (3.15) and recall from (3.16) that AJ − rJ = 0. Thus, Ito’s formula
together with integration by parts yield
e−rtJ(Yt) = J(y) +
∫ t
0
e−rs(h(Ys)− Γ){dBs + αsds},
where α is an arbitrary admissible strategy of the insider. Since h and v are bounded,∫ t
0
e−rs(h(Ys)− Γ)dBs
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is a uniformly integrable martingale. Thus, since J ≥ 0,
Ev
∫ ∞
0
e−rs(v − h(Ys))αsds ≤ J(y),
i.e., J(y) is an upper bound for the expected profits of the insider. Observe that the distribution
of J(Yt) under P
v depends on the choice of α. Thus, if we can find an admissible α for which
Ev limt→∞ e−rtJ(Yt) = 0, it will be optimal. However, Lemma 3.2 shows that if α is given by
(3.18), then this limit indeed equals 0. Moreover, since h is bounded, the admissibility of α will
follow as soon as ∫ t
0
|αs|ds <∞,Pv-a.s..
Indeed, on [Γ = 1] for every T > 0, we have∫ T
0
Ev
{
s′(Yt)
s(Yt)
}
dt =
∫ T
0
Ey
{
s′(Rt)
s(Rt)
s(Rt)
}
dt
=
∫ T
0
Ey
{
s′(Rt)
}
dt,
in view of the absolute continuity relationship between the solutions of (3.17) and the Ornstein-
Uhlenbeck process with the generator (3.13) as observed in the proof of Theorem 3.1. Moreover,
since 0 < s < 1 and s′ is bounded the admissibility on the set [Γ = 1] is verified. It can be shown
similarly that α is admissible on the set [Γ = 0]. This completes the proof. 
A Markovian equilibrium for the market under consideration is given in the following:
Theorem 3.2. Let a ≡ 1, φ(x) = rx+ d for some d ∈ R, s be the function defined in (3.14), y is
the unique solution of s(y) = p, and α be the process given by (3.18). Then, ((1, φ, y), s, α) is an
equilibrium.
Proof. Given this choice of σ, φ, and s, we have seen in Proposition 3.2 that α is optimal. Thus, it
remains to show, in view of Proposition 2.2, that
s(Yt) = E[Γ|FXt ] = E[Γ|FYt ]
as all FX (or, equivalently, FY ) martingales are continuous due to the fact the filtration is Brownian
(see Corollary 3.2 for another manifestation of this fact). However, this assertion follows easily from
Theorem 3.1 since s(y) = P(Γ = 1). 
Although the theorem above gives the impression that there is a continuum of equilibria indexed
by d, in fact all these choices of φ lead to the same SDE for the price. Moreover, the insider’s
optimal strategy does not depend on d when expressed in terms of P .
Corollary 3.1. Let d, φ, and α be as in Theorem 3.2 and let P ∗ be the equilibrium price associated
to ((1, φ, y), s, α). Then, P ∗ is a uniformly integrable FX -martingale with P ∗∞ = Γ, and
P ∗t = E[Γ] +
∫ t
0
λ(P ∗s )
{
dBs +
(
Γ
λ(P ∗s )
P ∗s
− (1− Γ) λ(P
∗
s )
1− P ∗s
)
ds
}
, (3.19)
where λ(x) = s′0(s
−1
0 (x)) and s0 is the function in (3.14) with d = 0. In particular, the function λ
does not depend on d.
Moreover, the insider’s strategy in the equilibrium has the following from:
α∗t = Γ
λ(P ∗t )
P ∗t
− (1− Γ) λ(P
∗
t )
1− P ∗t
. (3.20)
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Proof. Let d ∈ R be fixed and Y = B + ∫ ·0(φ(Yt) + αt)dt so that P ∗t = s(Yt), where s is given by
(3.14). Then,
dP ∗t = s
′(Yt)
{
dBt +
(
Γ
s′(Yt)
s(Yt)
− (1− Γ) s
′(Yt)
1− s(Yt)
)
dt
}
.
Observe that P ∗0 = s(y) = E[Γ] by the choice of y.
Next, note that
s(x) = s0
(
x+
d
r
)
,
implying s′(x) = s′0(x+
d
r
) as well as s−1(x) = s−10 (x) − dr . Combining these two observations we
then deduce that
s′(s−1(x)) = s′0(s
−1
0 (x)), ∀d ∈ R.
Therefore,
dP ∗t = s
′
0(s
−1
0 (P
∗
t ))
{
dBt +
(
Γ
s′0(s
−1
0 (P
∗
t ))
P ∗t
− (1− Γ)s
′
0(s
−1
0 (P
∗
t ))
1− P ∗t
)
dt
}
.
This yields, in view of the definition of λ, the dynamics of P ∗ given by (3.19).
That P ∗ is uniformly integrable follows from the boundedness of s. Its limiting property P ∗∞ =
s(Y∞) = Γ is due to Theorem 3.1.
The form of the insider’s strategy follows immediately from the corresponding change of variable.

In Kyle’s model with risk-neutral market makers it is in general observed that in equilibrium the
insider’s trades are inconspicuous, i.e. the distribution of the equilibrium demand process equals
to that of the noise trades. We observe the same phenomenon here.
Corollary 3.2. Consider the equilibrium described in Theorem 3.2 or Corollary 3.1 and let X∗
denote the equilibrium level of demand. Then, X∗ is a Brownian motion in its own filtration.
Proof. Note that
X∗t = Bt +
∫ t
0
α∗sds
where α∗ is given by (3.20). Recall that the relationship between X and Y entails they generate
the same filtration. Moreover, since the pricing rule is a strictly increasing function, we deduce
that the filtrations generated by P ∗ and X∗ coincide. Therefore,
E
[
α∗t
∣∣FX∗t ] = E [α∗t ∣∣FP ∗t ]
= E
[
Γ
∣∣FP ∗t ] λ(Pt)
Pt
−
(
1− E
[
Γ
∣∣FP ∗t ]) λ(Pt)
1− Pt
= 0
since P ∗ is a uniformly integrable FY ∗-martingale with P ∗∞ = Γ by Corolloary 3.1. Thus, X∗ is a
Brownian motion in its own filtration by Theorem 8.1 in [14]. 
Since we are able to characterise the equilibirium price process as a function of an Ornstein-
Uhlenbeck process, this allows us to observe a deviation in equilibrium from the original model
in Kyle. In [13], as explained in [3] and [9], the reciprocal of market depth, follows a martingale
preventing ‘systematic changes’ in the market depth. In the absence of such systematic changes the
insider cannot acquire a large position when the depth is low to liquidate at a later date when the
liquidity is higher to obtain unbounded profits. The reciprocal of the market depth is called Kyle’s
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lambda and it is given by the process λ(P ∗) in our model, where λ and P ∗ are as in Corollary 3.1.
The next result shows that, contrary to Kyle’s findings, the reciprocal of the market depth follows
a supermartingale, which was also observed by Back and Baruch in [2] using different arguments.
Corollary 3.3. Let λ and P ∗ be as in Corollary 3.1. Then, λ(P ∗) is an GM -supermartingale such
that limt→∞ E [λ(P ∗t )] = 0, i.e. λ(P ∗) is an GM -potential.
Proof. As observed earlier suppose without loss of generality that b = 0 so that φ(x) = rx and the
market makers’ signal, Y ∗, solves in its own filtration
dY ∗t = dβt + rY
∗
t dt,
where β is an FY ∗-Brownian motion. Since P ∗ = s0(Y ∗), it suffices to show that s′0(Y ∗) is a
FY ∗-supermartingale. Independence of τ and P ∗ will then imply that s′0(Y ∗), hence λ(Y ∗), is a
GM -supermartingale.
On the other hand,
s′0(x) =
√
r
π
e−rx
2
.
Thus, an application of Ito’s formula yields
ds′0(Y
∗
t ) = −s′0(Y ∗t ) (2rY ∗t dβt + rdt) ,
which in turn implies s′0(Y
∗) has the required supermartingale property. Moreover, as a consequence
of the Dominated Convergence Theorem, we obtain
lim
t→∞
E
[
s′0(Y
∗
t )
]
= E
[
lim
t→∞
s′0(Y
∗
t )
]
= 0
since limt→∞ |Y ∗t | =∞. 
Remark 1. In fact the actual marginal price impact that is observed in the market is given by
λ(Pt)1[τ>t] since the price is constant from τ onwards. Note that this is again a GM -supermartingale
in view of Lemma A.1.
A simple consequence of the above result is that the market gets more liquid on average as
time passes. The reason for this deviation from Kyle is due to the random deadline to the whole
trading activities, which is independent of everything else. The insider is aware of the fact that her
informational advantage is going to end at a totally inaccessible stopping time, which will come
as a surprise. She nevertheless chooses not to trade aggressively revealing her information quickly
since, as observed by Back and Baruch [2], the price impact is decreasing in time so the risk of
waiting can be compensated by lower execution costs.
Remark 2. The computations made in this section suggest that there is no equilibrium unless Γ
has a Bernoulli distribution. Indeed, if X is independent of τ , Proposition 3.1 implies that Y is a
transient Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process. On the other hand, P∞ = Γ and the equilibrium price is given
by a scale function of Y . Consequently, P∞ can take only two different values since Y∞ ∈ {−∞,∞}.
3.2. More general liquidation value. In this section we consider more general distributions
for Γ and suppose that Γ
d
= f(η) for some continuous and strictly increasing f and a standard
Normal random variable, η. We can incorporate atoms and consider more general distributions
for Γ. However, this will only result in more complicated coefficients for Y ∗ in the filtration of
the insider and will not significantly alter the qualitative inferences that one can make within this
model. Thus, for the simplicity of the exposition and the model we make the following assumption.
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Assumption 3.1. There exists a continuous and strictly increasing function f : R 7→ R such that
Γ
d
= f(η), where η is a standard normal random variable3.
Remark 2 suggests that one cannot go beyond a Bernoulli distributed payoff using a time-
homogeneous SDE for Y . Collin-Dufresne et al. [8] consider a similar problem when Γ
d
= η and
obtain an equilibrium, where the coefficients of Y ∗ depends on time using ideas from Kalman
filtering.
We will next show that an equilibrium exists for more general payoff distributions. In fact,
the market makers’ equilibrium signal process, Y ∗, will turn out to be just a time-change of the
Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process that appears in the equilibrium when Γ had a Bernoulli distribution
as in last section.
To wit, let’s suppose
dYt = σ(t)a(Yt)dXt + σ
2(t)φ(Yt)dt,
where σ : R+ 7→ R+. Following similar arguments that were used in the beginning of Section 3.1
after the obvious modifications we obtain
ht +
1
2
a2σ2hyy + σ
2φhy = 0 (3.21)
1
2
aσ2a′′ + φσ2
a′
a
− σ2φ′ + σ
′
σ
+ r = 0. (3.22)
It is easy to check that when σ ≡ 1 the above equations reduce to (3.10) and (3.11).
As in previous section we shall choose a ≡ 1 and φ(x) = rx. This implies
σ′
σ(1− σ)(1 + σ) = −r. (3.23)
Since
1
x(1− x)(1 + x) =
1
x
+
1
2(1 − x) −
1
2(1 + x)
,
integrating (3.23) yields
σ2(t)
1− σ2(t) = C
2e−2rt
for some constant C to be determined later. Thus, we can solve the above to deduce
σ2(t) =
C2e−2rt
1 + C2e−2rt
. (3.24)
The next lemma will define a function, which will later turn out to be the value function for the
insider.
Lemma 3.3. Let h : R+ × R 7→ R satisfy (3.21) such that h(t, ·) is strictly increasing for each
t ≥ 0. Consider
J(t, y) :=
∫ y
h−1(t,v)
h(t, x) − v
σ(t)
dx+
1
2
ert
∫ ∞
t
e−rsσ(s)hy(s, h−1(s, v))ds, (3.25)
where h−1(t, ·) represents the inverse of h(t, ·) for every t ≥ 0. Then,
Jt +
1
2
σ2(t)Jyy + σ
2(t)ryJy − rJ = 0
3 d= stands for equality in distribution.
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provided ∫ ∞
t
e−rsσ(s)hy(s, h−1(s, v))ds <∞, ∀t ≥ 0.
Proof. Direct differentiation yields
Jt =
∫ y
h−1(t,v)
ht(t, x)
σ(t)
dx−
∫ y
h−1(t,v)
h(t, x)− v
σ2(t)
σ′(t)dx
+
rert
2
∫ ∞
t
e−rsσ(s)hy(s, h−1(s, v))ds − 1
2
σ(s)hy(t, h
−1(t, v))
= −σ(t)
∫ y
h−1(t,v)
{
1
2
hyy(t, x) + hy(t, x)rx
}
dx−
∫ y
h−1(t,v)
h(t, x)− v
σ2(t)
σ′(t)dx
+
rert
2
∫ ∞
t
e−rsσ(s)hy(s, h−1(s, v))ds − 1
2
σ(s)hy(t, h
−1(t, v))
=
σ(t)
2
(
hy(t, h
−1(t, v))− hy(t, y)
) − ∫ y
h−1(t,v)
h(t, x) − v
σ2(t)
σ′(t)dx
−σ(t)
∫ y
h−1(t,v)
hy(t, x)rxdx+
rert
2
∫ ∞
t
e−rsσ(s)hy(s, h−1(s, v))ds − 1
2
σ(t)hy(t, h
−1(t, v)).
Thus,
Jt +AJ − rJ = σ(t)ry(h(t, y) − v)−
∫ y
h−1(t,v)
(h(t, x)− v)(rσ + σ′(t))
σ(t)
dx
−σ(t)
∫ y
h−1(t,v)
hy(t, x)rxdx
= σ(t)ry(h(t, y) − v)− rσ(t)
∫ y
h−1(t,v)
(h(t, x) − v)dx− σ(t)
∫ y
h−1(t,v)
hy(t, x)rxdx
= 0,
where the last equality follows from integration by parts. 
The PDE (3.21) satisfied by h indicates that the market makers’s signal in equilibrium will be a
time-changed Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process, where the time change is given by
V (t) :=
∫ t
0
σ2(s)ds =
1
2r
log
1 + C2
1 + C2e−2rt
. (3.26)
Indeed, any solution of (3.21) can be obtained by a time change as we see in the next lemma.
Lemma 3.4. Suppose that a ≡ 1 and φ(x) = rx. Then h is a solution of (3.21) iff g defined by
g(t, y) := h(V −1(t), y),
where V is the absolutely continuous function given in (3.26), solves
gt +
1
2
gyy + rygy = 0. (3.27)
Proof. Note that h(t, y) = g(V (t), y). Since dV (t) = σ2(t)dt, the claim follows. 
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Consistent with the findings of the previous section the insider should construct a bridge process,
Y ∗, such that limt→∞ h∗(t, Y ∗t ) = Γ and Y ∗, in its own filtration, follows
dY ∗t = σ(t)dB
Y
t + rσ
2(t)Y ∗t dt,
i.e. a time-changed version of the Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process with the generator (3.13), where
d = 0. As we observed in the previous lemma the time change is given by the function V (t), which
converges to V (∞) = 12r log(1 + C2) < ∞. This implies that the distribution of Y ∗∞ equals that
of the Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process at V (∞) defined by (3.13) with d = 0. This distribution is
Gaussian and allows us to go beyond a Bernoulli distribution for Γ.
Let p(t, x, y) be the transition density of the Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process defined by (3.13) with
d = 0. It is well-known that
p(t, x, y) = q
(
e2rt − 1
2r
, y − xert
)
,
where q(t, x) = 1√
2πt
e−
x2
2t . The next theorem defines the bridge process that will be the key to the
insider’s strategy in the equilibrium.
Theorem 3.3. Let f be the function in Assumption 3.1 and assume C2 = 2r. Then, for any
v ∈ R, there exists a unique strong solution to
Yt =
∫ t
0
σ(s)dBs + r
∫ t
0
f−1(v)− Ys cosh
(
1
2 log(1 + 2re
−2rs)
)
sinh
(
1
2 log(1 + 2re
−2rs)
) σ2(s)ds, (3.28)
where σ > 0 is defined via (3.24). Moreover, limt→∞ Yt = f−1(v), Qv-a.s., where Qv is the law of
the solution. Moreover,
EQ
v
[F (Ys; s ≤ t)] =
EQ
[
p(V (∞)− V (t), Yt, f−1(v))F (Ys; s ≤ t)
]
p(V (∞), 0, f−1(v)) , (3.29)
where F is a bounded measurable function and Q is the law of the unique solution to
Yt =
∫ t
0
σ(s)dBs + r
∫ t
0
σ2(s)Ysds. (3.30)
Proof. The existence and uniqueness of the solution follows immediately since the SDE has Lipschitz
coefficients in every compact interval [0, T ].
Next observe that
1
2
log(1 + 2re−2rt) = r(V (∞)− V (t)).
Thus, if we define Rt := YV −1(t), we obtain
Rt =
∫ V −1(t)
0
σ(s)dBs + r
∫ t
0
f−1(v)−Rs cosh (r(V (∞)− s))
sinh (r(V (∞)− s)) ds.
On the other hand, βt :=
∫ V −1(t)
0 σ(s)dBs is a local martingale with respect to the filtration (Gt)t≥0,
where Gt := FV −1(t). Moreover, [β, β]t = t for each t ≥ 0. Therefore, it is a G-Brownian motion.
Consequently,
Rt = βt + r
∫ t
0
f−1(v)−Rs cosh (r(V (∞)− s))
sinh (r(V (∞)− s)) ds, t < V (∞). (3.31)
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However, the above is the SDE for
ρt =Wt + r
∫ t
0
ρsds
conditioned on the event [ρV (∞) = f−1(v)]. Indeed, the SDE representation of this Markovian
bridge follows from Example 2.3 in [10], which coincides with the above SDE since F (t) = ert
and Σ(s, t) = e
2rt−1
2r , where F and Σ are the functions defined in Example 2.3 of [10]. Therefore,
Rt → f−1(v) as t→ V (∞), which is equivalent to Yt → f−1(v) as t→∞.
The absolute continuity relationship is a consequence of Theorem 2.2 in [10] since the solution
of (3.30) is a Markov process with transition density p(V (t)− V (s), y, z). 
We are now ready to state the existence of an equilibrium in the next theorem, whose proof is
postponed to Appendix B.
Theorem 3.4. Suppose C2 = 2r and assume that there exist positive constants K > 0 and k < 11+2r
such that
|f(y)| ≤ Keky
2
4 .
Define
g(t, y) :=
∫ ∞
−∞
f(z)p(V (∞)− t, y, z)dz
and let h∗(t, y) = g(V (t), y). Then, ((σ∗, φ∗, 0), h∗, α∗) is an equilibrium, where σ∗ is the positive
square root of (3.24) with C2 = 2r, φ∗(y) = ry, and
α∗(t) = rσ∗(t)
(
f−1(Γ)− Y ∗t cosh
(
1
2 log(1 + 2re
−2rt)
)
sinh
(
1
2 log(1 + 2re
−2rt)
) − Y ∗t
)
.
Moreover,
Y ∗t =
∫ t
0
σ∗(s)dB∗s + r
∫ t
0
(σ∗(s))2Y ∗s ds, (3.32)
where B∗ is an FY ∗-Brownian motion.
As in the time-homogeneous case, Kyle’s lambda will be a uniformly integrable supermartingale.
However, contrary to the time-homogeneous case it won’t disappear as t → ∞, i.e. it won’t be a
potential in general.
Proposition 3.3. Consider the equilibrium given in Theorem 3.4 and define λ∗t := h
∗
y(t, Y
∗
t ). Then,
λ∗ is a uniformly integrable (FY ∗ ,P)-supermartingale and
lim
t→∞
E[λ∗t ] =
∫ ∞
−∞
f ′(z)
1√
2π
e−
z2
2 dz. (3.33)
Proof. Define u(t, y) = h∗y(t, y). Differentiating
h∗t +
σ2(t)
2
h∗yy + σ
2(t)ryh∗y = 0
with respect to y yields
ut +
σ2(t)
2
uyy + σ
2(t)ryuy = −rσ2(t)u.
Applying Ito formula to u and Y ∗, which satisfies (3.32), yields
dλ∗t = uy(t, Y
∗
t )σ
∗(t)dB∗t − r(σ∗(t))2λ∗t dt.
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Since λ∗ ≥ 0, the stochastic integral in the above decomposition is a supermartingale, which leads
to the desired supermartingale property of λ∗.
It follows from (B.37) that
u(t, y) =
√
1 + 2re−2rt
∫ ∞
−∞
f ′(z)p(V (∞)− V (t), y, z)dz.
Thus, λ∗∞ := limt→∞ λ∗t = f ′(Y ∗∞), P-a.s. and
E[u(t, Y ∗t )] =
√
1 + 2re−2rt
∫ ∞
−∞
f ′(z)p(V (∞), 0, z)dz
by Chapman-Kolmogorov equation. Therefore,
lim
t→∞
E[u(t, Y ∗t )] =
∫ ∞
−∞
f ′(z)p(V (∞), 0, z)dz = E[f ′(Y ∗∞)] = E[λ∗∞].
This implies λ∗ is a uniformly integrable supermartingale. (3.33) follows from the fact that Y ∗∞ is
standard normal. 
Remark 3. As in Corollary 3.2 one can show that the insider’s trades are inconspicuous, i.e. X∗
is a Brownian motion in its own filtration. This directly follows from the equilibrium level of Y ∗,
which satisfies (3.32).
4. Conclusion
Using tools from potential theory of one-dimensional diffusions we have solved a version of the
Kyle model with general payoffs when the announcement date has an exponential distribution and
is independent of all other parameters of the model. It is shown that a stationary equilibrium exists
only if the payoff has a Bernoulli distribution, which corresponds to the special case considered in [2].
The approach considered herein is novel in its study and characterisation of the optimal strategies
of the insider in terms of excessive functions of an associated diffusion process. In particular the
so-called Kyle’s lambda, which is a measurement of liquidity, is identified with a potential.
As in the earlier literature on the Kyle model we have shown that the total demand for the asset
in equilibrium has the same distribution as that of the noise traders, i.e. the insider’s trades are
inconspicuous. What is different from the earlier models, however, is that the equilibrium prices
no longer converge to the payoff, Γ, as the time approaches to the announcement date. That is,
there is a jump in the price when Γ becomes public knowledge. This is due to the fact that the
announcement comes as a surprise even for the insider and, therefore, she is not able to construct
a bridge of random length τ for the demand process in order for the prices to converge to Γ (cf.
bridge construction in [7]). However, in equilibrium she trades in such a way that the price process
conditioned on no announcement, i.e. P , converges to Γ.
It will be interesting to see how these conclusions, especially the last one, change if the announce-
ment date, τ , is no longer assumed to be independent of the other variables. However, this would
require a framework beyond the scope of the current paper and is left for future study.
Appendix A. Proof of Proposition 2.2
Recall that we are searching for a decomposition
St = Pt1[t<τ ] + Γ1[t≥τ ],
FINANCIAL EQUILIBRIUM WITH ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION AND RANDOM HORIZON 19
where P is a semimartingale adapted to FX . In order for P to be a candidate price process on
the set [t < τ ] one must have that S is a GM -martingale. To this end the following lemma will be
crucial.
Lemma A.1. Define
Nt := Γ1[t≥τ ] − r
∫ t
0
1[s<τ ]E[Γ|FXs ]ds,
Mt := 1[t≥τ ] − r
∫ t
0
1[s<τ ]ds
Then, N and M are GM -martingales.
Proof. Note that for s < t
E[Nt|GMs ] = 1[τ≤s]E
[
Γ− r
∫ τ
0
E[Γ|FXu ]du
∣∣∣∣GMs
]
+ 1[τ>s]E
[
Γ1[t≥τ ] − r
∫ t
0
1[u<τ ]E[Γ|FXu ]du
∣∣∣∣GMs
]
= 1[τ≤s]Ns + 1[τ>s]
(
E[Γ|FXs ](1− e−r(t−s))− r
∫ s
0
E[Γ|FXu ]du
)
−1[τ>s]E
[∫ t
s
r1[u<τ ]E[Γ|FXu ]du
∣∣∣∣GMs
]
= 1[τ≤s]Ns + 1[τ>s]
(
E[Γ|FXs ](1− e−r(t−s))− r
∫ s
0
E[Γ|FXu ]du
)
−1[τ>s]
∫ t
s
re−r(u−s)E[Γ|FXs ]du
= Ns,
where the second and third equalities are due to the independence of X and τ .
The proof for the martingale property of M follows the similar lines. 
In view of the above lemma in order for S to be a GM -martingale one needs to show that
Ut := Pt1[t<τ ] + r
∫ t
0
1[s<τ ]E[Γ|FXs ]ds (A.34)
is a GM -martingale. This leads to
Proof of Proposition 2.2. Suppose that the semimartingale decomposition of P is given by Pt =
P0 + Zt + At where Z is a continuous local martingale and A is a predictable process of finite
variation4. Let
Ut = Pt1[t<τ ] + r
∫ t
0
1[s<τ ]E[Γ|FXs ]ds.
Then, in view of the previous lemma we have
dUt = 1[t≤τ ]{dZt + dAt} − Pt−{dMt + r1[t<τ ]dt}+ r1[t<τ ]E[Γ|FXt ]dt−∆Aτ1[t=τ ]
= 1[t≤τ ]dZt − Pt−dMt + 1[t<τ ]dAt + r1[t<τ ]
(
E[Γ|FXt ]− Pt
)
dt.
Consequently, ∫ t
0
{
1[s<τ ]dAs + r1[s<τ ]
(
E[Γ|FXs ]− Ps
)
ds
}
4Under the assumption that all martingales are continuous the optional and the predictable σ-algebras coincide.
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is a predictable local martingale of finite variation. Thus,
1[t<τ ]dAt = 1[t<τ ]r(Pt − E[Γ|FXt ])dt.
Since τ is independent of FX and P(τ > t) > 0 for all t ≥ 0, this yields
dAt = r(Pt − E[Γ|FXt ])dt.
Thus, A is continuous and so is P . Consider
τn := inf{t ≥ 0 : |Zt| > n}.
Since Z is continuous, τn →∞, P-a.s..
Next, let Γˆt = E[Γ|FXt ] and consider σn := inf{t ≥ 0 : |Pt − Γˆt| > n}, which converges to ∞ due
to the continuity of P and Γˆ. Then,
Pt∧τn∧σm − Γˆt∧τn∧σm − r
∫ t∧τn∧σm
0
(Ps − Γˆs)ds
is a martingale for each n and and m. Moreover, denoting the semimartingale local time of P − Γˆ
at 0 by L, we deduce that∣∣∣Pt∧τn∧σm − Γˆt∧τn∧σm ∣∣∣− r
∫ t∧τn∧σm
0
∣∣∣Pu − Γˆu∣∣∣ du− Lt∧τn∧σm (A.35)
is a G-local martingale and, thus a submartingale being bounded from above.
Also, note that since S is a uniformly integrable martingale as observed on the proof of Propo-
sition 2.1, 1[τ>t]|Pt| ≤ St, and τ is independent of P , (Pt∧τn∧σm)n≥1,m≥1 is uniformly integrable.
Thus, we obtain for s < t
E
[
|Pt − Γˆt|
∣∣FXs ] ≥ |Ps − Γˆs|+ r
∫ t
s
E
[
|Pu − Γˆu|
∣∣FXs ] du
after taking limits as n→∞ and m→∞ and utilising the monotone convergence theorem on the
integral in (A.35) as well as the fact that L is increasing.
A straightforward application of Gronwall’s inequality, therefore, implies that for any t > s
E
[∣∣∣Pt − Γˆt∣∣∣ ∣∣FXs ] ≥ ∣∣∣Ps − Γˆs∣∣∣ er(t−s). (A.36)
On the other hand,
1[τ>s]E
[|St − Γ| ∣∣GMs ] = 1[τ>s]E [1τ>t |Pt − Γ| ∣∣GMs ]
= 1[τ>s]e
−r(t−s)E
[|Pt − Γ| ∣∣FXs ] ≥ 1[τ>s]e−r(t−s)E [∣∣∣Pt − Γˆt∣∣∣ ∣∣FXs ] ,
where the last inequality follows from Jensen’s inequality since Pt is FXt -measurable.
However, (A.36) then yields
lim
t→∞
1[τ>s]E
[|St − Γ| ∣∣GMs ] ≥ lim
t→∞
∣∣∣Ps − Γˆs∣∣∣ = ∣∣∣Ps − Γˆs∣∣∣ ,
which contradicts (2.3) unless Ps = Γˆs, P-a.s.. Since P and Γˆ are continuous, the null set can be
chosen to be independent of s, which completes the proof. 
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Appendix B. Proof of Theorem 3.4
We will show that ((σ∗, φ∗, 0), h∗, α∗) is an equilibrium by checking 1) α∗ is admissible and
optimal given (σ∗, φ∗, 0) and 2) (σ∗, φ∗, 0) is an admissible pricing rule given α∗.
Step 1. Insider’s optimality. In view of Lemma 3.3 let us first verify that∫ ∞
t
e−rsσ∗(s)h∗y(s, h
−1(s, v))ds <∞, ∀t ≥ 0.
To see this first observe that h∗y(s, h
−1(s, v)) = 1
dh−1(s,y)
dy
and
y =
∫ ∞
−∞
f(z)p(V (∞)− V (t), h−1(t, y), z)dz
=
∫ ∞
−∞
f(z)p(
1
2r
log(1 + 2re−2rt), h−1(t, y), z)dz
=
∫ ∞
−∞
f(z)q(e−2rt, z − h−1(t, y)
√
1 + 2re−2rt)dz. (B.37)
Due to the bound on f we can differentiate inside the integral sign to get
0 <
1
dh−1(s,y)
dy
=
√
1 + 2re−2rt
∫ ∞
−∞
f(z)
z − h−1(t, y)√1 + 2re−2rt
e−2rt
q(e−2rt, z − h−1(t, y)
√
1 + 2re−2rt)dz
=
√
1 + 2re−2rt
∫ ∞
−∞
f(z + h−1(t, y)
√
1 + 2re−2rt)
z
e−2rt
q(e−2rt, z)dz
≤ C exp
(
k
2
(h−1(t, y))2(1 + 2r)
)
e3rt
∫ ∞
0
z√
2π
exp
(
−z
2
2
(e2rt − k)
)
dz
= C exp
(
k
2
(h−1(t, y))2(1 + 2r)
)
e3rt
e2rt − k
∼ C exp
(
k
2
(h−1(t, y))2(1 + 2r)
)
ert as t→∞, (B.38)
where C in above (and also throughout the proof) is a constant, independent of t, that
might change from line to line. Moreover, h−1(t, y) = g−1(V (t), y) is bounded for fixed y
since V (∞) <∞ and g(, ·, y) is strictly increasing and continuous on [0, V (∞)] for each y.
Thus, the above asymptotics establishes that the condition is verified since∫ ∞
0
σ∗(s) <∞.
Thus, for any admissible α we have
e−rtJ(t, Yt) = J(0, 0) +
∫ t
0
e−rs(h(s, Ys)− Γ) {dBs + αsds}
due to the fact that Jt+AJ − rJ = 0 by Lemma 3.3. In view of the admissibility condition
(2.5) (∫ t
0
e−rs(h(s, Ys)− Γ)dBs
)
t≥0
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is a uniformly integrable martingale martingale that converges in L1(dPv). Thus, if e−rtJ(t, Yt)
has a limit in L1(dPv) as t→∞, then
Ev
∫ ∞
0
e−rs(h(s, Ys)− Γ)αsds = J(0, 0) − Ev lim
t→∞
e−rtJ(t, Yt).
Since J ≥ 0, α will be the optimal strategy if it achieves limt→∞ e−rtJ(t, Yt) = 0. To see
that the above limit holds in L1(dPv), first note that
e−rt
1
σ∗(t)
∫ y
h−1(t,v)
(h(t, x) − v)dx ≤
√
1 + 2r√
2r
∫ y
h−1(t,v)
(h(t, x) − v)dx
≤
√
1 + 2r√
2r
(h(t, y) − v)(y − h−1(t, v)) (B.39)
due to (3.24) and the fact that h is increasing in y. Thus, limt→∞ e−rtJ(t, Yt) = 0, Pv-a.s.
if Yt − h−1(t, v) → 0, Pv-a.s.. However, Theorem 3.3 shows that α∗ makes limt→∞ Y ∗t =
f−1(v) = limt→∞ h−1(t, v), Pv-a.s.. Thus, if supt≥0 Ev|h∗(s, Y ∗s )|2+ε + Ev|Y ∗t |2+ǫ < ∞, for
some ǫ > 0, we can conclude that e−rtJ(t, Yt) converges to 0 in L1(dPv) as t→∞ in view
of (B.39). Note that supt≥0 Ev(h∗(s, Y ∗s ))2 <∞ will also imply that α∗ is admissible.
We shall first show that Ev(Y ∗t )2+ε is bounded. Indeed, in view of the absolute continuity
relationship established in Theorem 3.3, we have
Ev|Y ∗t |2+ε = EQ
[ |Y ∗t |2+εp(V (∞)− V (t), Y ∗t , f−1(v))
p(V (∞), 0, f−1(v))
]
=
1√
2πp(V (∞), 0, f−1(v))
∫ ∞
−∞
ert|y|2+εp(V (∞)− V (t), y, f−1(v)) exp
(
− y
2
2e−2rt
)
dy
≤ Ce−rt
∫ ∞
−∞
|y|εp(V (∞)− V (t), y, f−1(v))dy
≤ C.
In above, the third line follows from the boundedness of xe−x on (0,∞) and the last line is
due to the finiteness of V (∞).
To show supt≥0 Ev|h∗(s, Y ∗s )|2+ε <∞ first note that
|h(t, y)| ≤ C exp
(
k
2
y2(1 + 2r)
)∫ ∞
−∞
ert√
2π
exp
(
−z
2
2
(e2rt − k)
)
dz
≤ C exp
(
k
2
y2(1 + 2r)
)
ert√
e2rt − k ≤ C exp
(
k
2
y2(1 + 2r)
)
, (B.40)
in view of the exponential bound on f and similar arguments that led to (B.38).
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Therefore, setting kε = k(1 + ǫ/2),
Ev|h∗(s, Y ∗s )|2+ε ≤ C
∫ ∞
−∞
exp
(
kεz2(1 + 2r)
)
q
(
e−2rs, f−1(v) − z
√
1 + 2re−2rs
)
q
(
1
1 + 2re−2rs
, z
)
dz
≤ C
∫ ∞
−∞
exp
(
z2
{
(1 + 2r)kε − 1 + 2re
−2rs
2
})
q
(
e−2rs, f−1(v)− z
√
1 + 2re−2rs
)
dz
≤ C
∫ ∞
−∞
exp
(
z2e−2rs
{
(1 + 2r)kε
1 + 2re−2rs
− 1
2
})
exp
(
−(f
−1(v)ers − z)2
2
)
dz
≤ C exp
(
(f−1(v))2
m(s)
1− 2e−2rsm(s)
)
,
where
m(s) :=
kε(1 + 2r)
1 + 2re−2rs
− 1
2
<
1
2
,
if ǫ > 0 is chosen small enough. This completes the proof of that Ev|h∗(s, Y ∗s )|2+ε is
bounded. Hence, α∗ is an admissible optimal strategy.
Step 2. Market makers’ best response. Recall that
h∗(t, y) =
∫ ∞
−∞
f(z)q(e−2rt, z − y
√
1 + 2re−2rt)dz
=
∫ ∞
−∞
f(z + y
√
1 + 2re−2rt)q(e−2rt, z)dz,
which shows that h∗ is strictly increasing since f is. All that remains to show now is that
h∗(t, Y ∗t ) is a (FY
∗
t ,P)-martingale converging to f(v).
It follows from Theorem 3.3 and the disintegration formula (2.1) that for any bounded
and measurable F we have
E
[
F (Y ∗t )|FY
∗
s
]
=
∫
R
Ev
[
F (Y ∗t )|FY
∗
s
]
ν(dv)
=
∫
R
EQ
[
F (Yt)p(V (∞)− V (t), Yt, f−1(v))|FYs
]
p(V (∞)− V (t), Ys, f−1(v)) ν(dv).
As we did before let Rt = YV −1(t), where Y is the solution of (3.30). Thus,
dRt = dβt + rRtdt,
for some Brownian motion β, which in particular implies Y under Q is normal with mean
0 and variance equalling
e2rV (t) − 1
2r
=
1
1 + 2re−2rt
.
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Thus,
E
[
F (Y ∗t )|FY
∗
s
]
=
∫
R
EQ
[
F (RV (t))p(V (∞)− V (t), RV (t), f−1(v))|FYs
]
p(V (∞)− V (t), RV (s), f−1(v))
ν(dv)
=
∫
R
∫
R
f(y)
p(V (∞)− V (t), y, f−1(v))p(V (t)− V (s), RV (s), y)
p(V (∞)− V (s), RV (s), f−1(v))
dyν(dv)
=
∫
R
EQ
[
F (RV (t))
∣∣RV (s), RV (∞) = f−1(v)] ν(dv)
= EQ
[
F (RV (t))
∣∣RV (s)] ,
where the last line is due to the fact that RV (∞) is a standard normal random variable due
to the choice of C2, and f−1(Γ) has a standard normal distribution by Assumption 3.1.
Thus, the processes Y ∗ and RV (·) have the same law. This implies that Y ∗ satisfies (3.32)
and, in particular, h∗(t, Y ∗t ) is a (FY
∗
t ,P)-martingale. The convergence is immediate since
limt→∞ Y ∗t = v, P
v-a.s., by Theorem 3.3.
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